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ABSTRACT: 
 
Firms pursue growth internally via research & development activities and externally through 
mergers and acquisitions. There is a trade-off between them, and optimal allocation is crucial to 
company’s long-term profitability and competitiveness. This study investigates the relationship 
between mergers & acquisition and research & development. More specifically, the aim is to 
examine how these strategic decisions affect stock market valuation and long-term profitability 
of the acquiring firm in technology-driven industries.  
 
A sample of 401 US technology acquirer between 2010-2018 is constructed to test the linkage 
between M&As and R&D on stock market valuation and profitability. Previous studies report the 
positive effect of technology mergers to acquiring firm’s valuation and profitability. Hence, the 
first hypothesis states that acquiring a technology firm increases the current market valuation 
of technology acquirer’s R&D spending. Second hypothesis continues by examining whether 
M&As strengthen the linkage between acquirer’s current R&D spending and its future profita-
bility.  
 
The stock market response towards R&D spending is found to be positive after M&As. That in-
dicates that investors expect the merger to intensify the R&D activities of the acquiring firm 
leading to better performance in future. However, the expectations are not always fulfilled since 
the acquirer’s R&D spending in the year of the M&A is not reflected more strongly in its future 
profitability than in other years. It is also found that the overall R&D spending of the acquirer 
decreases after M&As. These results illustrate the shift from so called scale deals to scope deals, 
where the mergers are motivated by access to new markets or product lines. It is suggested that 
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Sustainable growth is a crucial component in creating shareholder value. It can be pur-
sued internally via research and development activities or inorganically through mergers 
and acquisitions. During recent decades mergers and acquisition activity has been in-
creasing and gaining popularity. In 2018 mergers and acquisition hit new records and the 
market shows no signs slowing down (Deloitte, 2019). A large set of megadeals have 
taken place among corporate giants (Platt, 2018). The popularity of M&As speaks for the 
fact that executives believe M&As create value. Concurrent with M&A activity increase 
the role of R&D has emphasized especially in western countries, since evolving technol-
ogy is unlimited component in economic growth. The rapid technological development 
and increasing competition partly due globalization has highlighted the importance of 
innovation. At the turn of the decade the role of innovation and sustainable solutions is 
strengthened elsewhere in societies as well as civilizations has faced unprecedented 
challenges, like global warming and recent coronavirus pandemic. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are strategic decisions that take place for various reasons. 
Shareholder value is increased through synergy benefits, efficiency gains, diversification, 
eliminating the competitors and strengthening the position in the market. Especially in 
downturns M&As offer rapid gain and help to maintain growth. Diversification can be 
viewed dispersing the risks since by buying companies from different industries the ac-
quirer is able to generate income regardless of how the parent company itself performs.  
 
Large companies often pursue a strategy of acquisitive growth. Pitts (1997) observes that 
after acquisition the acquirer’s R&D spending decreases. This can be due to redefining 
internal R&D activities and enhancing the R&D efficiency. Synergy benefits including op-
erational efficiency speak for creative destruction, i.e. eliminating redundant and over-
lapping activities. The growth, improved profitability and better cost structure are 
among the most common reason for mergers and acquisitions (Ali-Yrkkö, 2002). The aim 
later is to investigate the impact of M&As to R&D output as well.  
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Acquisition are likely to benefit companies. Incompetent management is replaced and 
resources are put in more efficient use. Large acquirers can also help the target compa-
nies to commercialize their innovation faster. Acquirers, in turn, get access to new tech-
nology, intellectual property or new markets, channels or product lines. However, the 
executives are not always aware of the trade-off between M&As and R&D. Investments 
in acquisition often serve as a substitute for investments in R&D. The more dependent 
the company is from innovation, the more it should consider the long-term effects and 
target selection (Hitt et al., 1991.) Part of M&As turn out to be unprofitable resulting 
shareholder value decrease, inefficiencies, and under-utilization of capacity in economy. 
Studies report that M&A activity is sometimes based on questionable motives (Hitt, 
Keats & DeMarie, 1998). These include company managers’ personal incentives which 
are later presented more in detail. Poorly planned and executed mergers and acquisi-
tions may backfire by impairing companies’ competitiveness and long-term profitability.  
Therefore, it is crucial to consider the deals carefully and ensure the smooth implemen-
tation to avoid post-merger integration problems.  
 
Studies report that the shareholder value increases especially in target companies, 
whereas the outcome for acquiring firm is more ambiguous. However, technology-ori-
ented M&As are found to be beneficial also for the acquirers (e.g., Higgins & Rodriguez, 
2006; Conn et al, 2005). Prior literature state that M&As in technology-intensive indus-
tries are strongly motivated by synergies. This is because the changes in technology-
driven fields occur in a rapid phase and this increases the idiosyncratic risks. Therefore, 
companies seek for strategic fit and technological cooperation (Kallunki, Pyykkö & 
Laamanen, 2009). Hitt et al. (2001) report that technology M&As ease the access to new 
but complementary technology which enhances acquirer’s R&D activities. The trade-off 
between M&As and R&D is in this regard less pronounced in high technology industries 
since technology M&As can be used for acquiring R&D to bridge the research gaps and 
to intensify the R&D processes. The synergies arising from technology are more unique 




1.1 Purpose of the study  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between mergers and acqui-
sitions (later M&As) and  research and development (R&D) activities, and their effect on 
stock market valuation of acquirer’s current R&D spending and its future profitability. 
The aim is to assess the effects of M&As and R&D both separately and combined. The 
former studies show that the relationship between R&D and M&A is ambiguous and that 
there is trade-off between M&A and R&D to some extent as well. The goal is to find out 
whether M&As among technology firms can help the acquiring firm to increase its’ R&D 
efficiency and valuation by harnessing synergies from technology-driven M&As.  
 
Both M&A and R&D are needed in modern economy and it is important to allocate the 
investments optimally between those two. Mergers and acquisitions as well as research 
and development have both been examined and they remain timely topic. The strong 
standpoint has been their value creation and profitability separately rather than investi-
gating them as combined. In this thesis the preliminary findings and conclusions are 
based on previous literature and established theories. There is strong evidence about 
the positive relationship between firm’s R&D spending and its future profitability (e.g., 
Xu et al, 2008; Guo et al, 2007; Chan et al, 2001). When it comes to M&As and firm’s 
performance, the prior studies yield mixed results.  
   
The arguments favouring the technology-oriented M&As arise from the synergy theory 
presented by Bradley, Desai & Kim (1983). Hitt et al. (2001) suggest that the combined 
post-merger R&D is more efficient when both target and the acquirer are committed to 
R&D. Inspired by Kallunki, Pyykkö & Laamanen (2009), the following hypotheses are 
formed: 
 
H1: The current market valuation of the technology acquirer’s R&D spending increases 




H2: Acquiring a technology target strengthens the linkage between technology ac-
quirer’s R&D spending and its future profitability.  
 
These hypotheses are examined by constructing a sample of US public acquirers and 
M&A transactions between 2010-2018. Although it is known that the post-merger per-
formance may be different for small and medium-sized firms than for large ones, the size 
of a firm in M&As is not taken into account in this thesis per se, since it is harder to 
observe firms that are not publicly quoted. 
 
  
1.2 Structure of the study  
The thesis follows the following structure: chapter two focuses on mergers and acquisi-
tions. It presents the incentives and latest trends in M&As. It also presents theoretical 
framework with value-increasing and value-destroying theories and the principle-agent 
dilemma. The decision-making regarding M&As is analysed at firm-level and from mac-
roeconomic perspective. 
 
Third chapter focuses on research and development. There is discussion about charac-
teristics of buyers and sellers and the firm-specific features affecting on R&D spending. 
The importance of constant development and the linkage to the competitiveness is also 
emphasized. The aim is also to shed light on other factors at macroeconomic level that 
may have influence on R&D spending. The PEST analysis is used in this examination with 
some modifications.  
  
Chapter four presents the data and methodology. The sample data is collected and com-
bined from Thomson Reuters Eikon’s Datastream and Worldscope platforms. The OLS 
regression specifications and descriptive statistics for the variables are also presented. 
The following chapter presents the results. In chapter six there is discussion about the 
results and previous research. Lastly, chapter seven summarizes and concludes the thesis.  
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2 Mergers & Acquisitions 
Mergers and acquisitions serve as a strategic tool to grow and reorganize the business. 
The distinction between mergers and acquisitions is not always clear to the public audi-
ence and in common language the concepts are used parallelly (Jensen, 1998). Both refer 
to joining of two or more entities, but the two concepts can also be distinguished. Ac-
quisition refers to takeover of another company or part of it. In merger companies join 
and intend to form a new entity as equal partners. Mergers and acquisitions are either 
friendly or hostile. Hostile M&As are accomplished through tender offer or proxy fight 
and are opposed by the target company’s management. In both friendly and hostile 
M&As it is usually reasonable to retain the control in one company. One firm stands as 
surviving corporation while the other firm gets absorbed (Badrtalei & Bates, 2007).  
  
  
2.1 Different types of Mergers and Acquisitions   
Mergers and acquisitions are part of operational restructuring of the company. They can 
be classified by different ways, but the most common classification includes four forms. 
Horizontal merger or acquisition takes place when two or more companies producing 
similar commodities join. Vertical M&As combine different business units that belong in 
the same value chain. Concentric mergers comprise firms that work in the same industry 
but in different value chain and produce different commodities. Lastly, conglomerate 
M&As join companies that operate in different industries and do not have direct linkage 
in their business. Conglomerate mergers can be either pure or mixed; in pure mergers 
the companies are completely unrelated businesses and in mixed mergers the compa-
nies seek for product or market extension.  
 
The goals of different M&A types differ. When a company enters horizontal or vertical 
acquisition, it aims to expand its business within the same sector and gain larger position 
in the markets. The advantages in concentric and conglomerate M&As are generated 
from diversification as the acquirer’s and target firm’s businesses are separated. 
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Horizontal and vertical are closely related to scale deals, which involve companies whose 
businesses overlap. Concentric and conglomerate mergers, in turn, bear resemblance to 
scope deals, which are M&As with distinct but related target firm (Harding, Jackson & 
Shankar, 2013). 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are also often classified into asset deals and share deals. In 
asset deal the trade involves buying the target company’s tangible and intangible assets 
that are important to acquirer’s operations. (Immonen, 2014: 18). In share deals the ac-
quirer purchases the shares. Share deals also have secondary market in exchanges. 
When the acquirer possesses more than 50 % of the target company’s shares, it becomes 
the parent company and has control over its subsidiary’s actions.   
 
  
2.2 Incentives for Mergers and Acquisitions   
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) present three major motives for M&As. Those are syn-
ergy-, agency- and hubris-based. Usually all three are involved in decision-making. Ali-
Yrkkö (2001) presents that in the finance and economics literature the strongest motive 
found for M&As is improvements in economic performance. In addition to value increase 
the synergy benefits often refers to cost reductions. Merging or closing branch offices, 
outsourcing certain activities and intensifying the lead time in joint value chain can gen-
erate significant savings. The costs to be cut can also include expenditures related to 
information technology and administration (Ali-Yrkkö, 2001). Potential cost reductions 
can also be found from diversifying M&A. These include costs spend on trade and com-
munications (Arrow, 1975). According to Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988) the motive for 
an acquisition determines whether it is experienced as hostile or friendly. Synergistic 
M&As are viewed friendly more often than disciplinary acquisitions. Mergers can also 
improve the financial position of companies because of possible tax advantages and be-
cause the cost of internal financing are typically lower than the cost of external financing 




There have been previous studies examining whether M&As within technology industry 
help the acquirer to improve its R&D operations. Bertrand & Zuninga (2006) present that 
companies substitute their internal R&D activities by M&As. Higgins & Rodriquez (2006) 
find that within technology-driven industries acquirers aim to pursue innovation and 
widen their R&D activities by acquiring other technology firms. To fully utilize the ac-
quired R&D the target company’s technology must complement the acquirer’s technol-
ogy. 
 
Gaining market power is also related to economic performance. Market power can be 
generated by several ways. Diversifying M&As, i.e., concentric and conglomerate mer-
gers, offer a way for a parent company to diversify risks and generate income regardless 
of its own performance. Second, it is often more profitable for a large company to ac-
quire competitor and obtain access to R&D and innovation rather than entering “R&D 
race” (Phillips & Zhdanov, 2012). In horizontal acquisition the acquirer can gain signifi-
cant market power by absorbing a competitive firm. In industries with little operating 
companies this may lead to market leadership, even to oligopoly or monopoly (Stigler, 
1950). Yet, countries have laws considering monopolies but sometimes the monopoly 
can come into existence naturally. Once the company is large enough, it may also be able 
to create barricades for entry for its future competitors by practicing predatory pricing, 
although this procedure is illegal according to most competition laws.  
  
One incentive in M&As is to acquire resources and assets. These assets can be tangible 
and intangible, such as patent and employees’ skills. Especially when a company wants 
to go international, acquiring existing company in the target country increases the ca-
pacity more rapidly than a greenfield investment and spares the acquirer from building 
foreign company from the scratch. Within foreign acquisition the acquirer can also ob-
tain some practical and valuable know-how about target country’s environmental factors 
(Ali-Yrkkö, 2001). However, at least in emerging countries self-developed resources are 
more prominent and advantageous than those endowed via acquisition (Yiu, Bruton & 
Lu, 2005). According to Jensen (1998), managers of companies compete for the rights to 
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control the company’s resources and the stronger managers tend to become buyers as 
the weaker managers are persuaded to sell and give up the control. If the acquisition is 
based on efficiency and better performance, usually both the acquirer and the selling 
company gain benefits. The target company also gains when the acquirer overestimates 
the value of the target firm (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993).   
 
Other motives originated from managerial level are rooted in principal-agent-theory. 
Sometimes owners (principals) and managers (agents) goals differ and even when it can 
be justified to separate management and ownership problems may arise (Garen, 1994). 
Managers may gain more financial benefits by making short-term decisions that may be 
harmful to the company’s shareholders in the long run. Hubris-based theories differ from 
agency theories in a sense of personal motives. Whereas in agency theories the execu-
tives may have strong personal incentives in M&As, hubris refers to well-intentioned mo-
tives ruined by overconfidence and arrogance.  
 
 
2.3 Recent Trends in M&A  
Besides the incentives at firm-level, there are macroeconomic factors that effect on M&A 
activity, too. Mergers occur in big macroeconomic changes. Shocks caused by technolog-
ical, economic, and regulatory factors drive industrial merger waves. The outcome of 
those waves is dependent on the current capital liquidity on the market (Harford, 2005). 
Political decisions such as free trade areas as well as excess capacity in the market act as 
driving forces in M&A activity (Ali-Yrkkö, 2002).  
 
Mergers also occur in waves (Harford, 2005). Both cross-border and domestic M&A tend 
to cluster by industry and time (Xu, 2017). M&A activity has rapidly increased after 1990s. 
The countries with most waves are the United States, the Great Britain and France. In US 
there have been even 46 merger waves and most of them have emerged during recent 
decades. One of the main reasons for the waves and increased M&A activity is globali-
zation and deregulation. Kleinert & Klodt (2002) present that simultaneous coincidence 
14 
 
of these two and their interrelation caused the fifth large merger wave, which was largely 
consisted of cross-border mergers. Privatization also has had an impact on the waves 
and alongside deregulation in certain industries that explains why mergers tend to clus-
ter.  One explanation for the M&A patterns is found from psychology. Chan & Cheung 
(2016) find that countries with cultural aspect of individualism and extraverted behav-
iour have an impact on the M&A patterns across countries. They state that there is a 
positive relationship between M&A activity and extraverted traits among the executives.  
 
For now, United States remains the largest acquiring nation measured by number of 
deals (Institute for Mergers and Acquisitions, 2018). However, The M&A activity is grow-
ing faster in emerging markets and Asian countries are leading the developing world. 
Developed and developing countries do not operate apart and the balance of power be-
tween nations has shifted. The consolidation between the two markets is rapid and it is 
more common that the acquiring party comes from emerging country (Rothenbuecher 
& von Hoyningen Huene, 2012). According to Institute for Mergers and Acquisitions 
(2019), the value of domestic, outbound, and inbound M&As in the United States ac-
counts for 62%, 10% and 28%, respectively. Most M&As are national but the share of 






Figure 1. Mergers & Acquisitions in US 1985-2019 
 
The figure above illustrates how the mergers occur in waves. The fifth merger begins in 
1993 after the economic slump of 1990-1991 and peaks five years later. The next slump 
in M&As activity occur in financial crisis of 2008. The steady growth of technology M&As 
towards the end of examination period in this study’s sample is in line with the pattern 
in figure 1.  
 
The role of M&As is perhaps the most enhanced in technology-intensive industries. Hal-
ler & Johnson (2019) report that deals in tech sector has been growing 31 % annually 
over the past five years. There has been a shift from horizontal and vertical M&As to-
wards concentric and conglomerate M&As. Haller & Johnson find that these so called 
scope deals account almost 90 % of technology M&As in 2019, and that the share of 
scope deals is increasing rapidly in technology-driven industries, whereas it has re-
mained the same in other industries. This suggests that the incentives for the mergers 
originate more and more from gaining access to new markets or product lines. 
 
 
2.4 Value increasing theories  
The assumption behind value increasing theories is that M&As benefits the companies 
by creating synergies that increase the firm’s value (Hitt et al., 2001). These synergies 
can be operational or related to increased market power or corporate control. Value in-
creasing theories include theory of efficiency, theory of corporate control and theory of 
market power.   
 
2.4.1 Theory of efficiency  
Theory of efficiency relies on the principle that by merging operative synergies can be 
achieved (Weitzel & McCarthy, 2011). The merger is friendly in most cases and both 
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parties have similar expectations about the outcome. Therefore, both the target com-
pany and the acquirer have positive returns. The efficiency is generated from abolishing 
unprofitable projects, removing bottlenecks and overlapping operations and utilizing 
possible benefits of scaling. This coincides with the concept of creative destruction, 
where useless affairs are eliminated (Schumpeter, 1942). Cutting the redundant activi-
ties can lead to improved efficiency of R&D as well, even when the overall R&D budget 
is reduced. The acquirer gets also access to intangible assets like patents and software. 
That can intensify the acquirer’s R&D processes resulting innovations on a faster phase. 
In technology M&As both the target firm and acquirer are committed in R&D since agile 
development in high technology industries is crucial. Synergies arise when the technol-
ogy obtained in M&A is put in more efficient use through integrating it to acquirer’s ex-
isting technology and through faster commercialization.  
 
However, the actual source of those benefits is ambiguous and it is under debate. Chat-
terjee (1986) emphasizes the difference between efficiency gains arisen from economies 
of scale and allocative synergies generated from strengthened market power. The ma-
jority of recently conducted studies agrees that the gains are results from increased ef-
ficiency, i.e. operative synergies (Mukherjee, Kiymaz & Baker, 2004; Houston, James & 
Ryngaert, 2001; Devos, Kadapakkam & Krishnamurthy, 2008). Yet, there are dissenting 
opinions that speak for phenomena related to market power as explaining factor; greater 
consumer surplus extraction, market mispricing and power through monopoly (Banerjee 
& Woodrow, 1998).  
  
  
2.4.2 Theory of market power  
Theory of market power refers to situation in which new, merged company has more 
market power than they had as separate companies. This is valid especially in horizontal 
and vertical mergers when M&As occur within same industry and the expansion takes 
place within same business sector. As two smaller former companies are replaced by one 
larger one, the new firm can act as price settler and generate surplus from higher prices 
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(Weitzel & McCarthy, 2011). Another way to gain is to lower costs and final prices (Posner, 
1976). The theory is more applicable in the concentrated markets and the market power 
is related to the size of the company. Chatterjee (1991) finds that the gain in vertical 
mergers is maximized when the acquirer comes from concentrated markets and target 
company from fragmented markets. The theory is also linked to the size of companies 
since the bigger firms gain more than smaller ones. 
 
Market power theory also acknowledges synergy benefits, but unlike in efficiency theory, 
the benefits arise from allocative synergies. Oligopoly acts as an incentive for M&As in 
horizontal and vertical mergers. Porter (1980) suggests that oligopoly via vertical inte-
gration can create barricades for entry and help to maintain the market position. Oligop-
olies occur in several industries. However, if monopoly in the market is achieved, the 
confluence between efficiency theory and market power theory disappears and the 
newly formed monopoly starts losing its agility and capability to innovate. This is because 
monopolies are widely argued to be inefficient. Lowered ratio of R&D spending to the 
book value of equity could be a warning sing in this regard. The firm no longer faces 
constant pressure to outperform competitors and this can lead to inefficient business 
functions and under-utilization of resources.   
  
2.4.3 Theory of corporate control  
Theory of corporate control focuses on management rather than operative synergies. In 
the light of this theory managers of firms are seen competitors and the weaker one is 
replaced by a stronger leader. The winner is the one who can offer most value to the 
shareholders. This is somewhat dynamic process where more competent managers re-
place weaker ones. In this case the creative destruction is directed towards personnel. 
Whereas efficiency theory suggest that the synergies add extra value to assets, corporate 
control theory favours the view where competent management re-allocate resources 
that were under-utilized in target company (Weitzel & McCarthy, 2011). Mergers are suc-
cessful when they result well-functioning firms that can fully utilize their assets. Solid 
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merger markets increase the wealth of shareholders and the whole society (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983). 
  
Takeovers are primarily hostile according to the theory of corporate control. There are 
controversial interpretations about the functionality of this theory. In hostile takeovers 
the boardroom changes typically occur regardless of the former performance (Franks &  
Mayer, 1996). According to Hitt et al., (1996) companies that actively sell or buy busi-
nesses are likely to innovate less internally. This may be an indicator of ill-advised target 
selection. Even though the management knows the importance of innovation, they often 
rather pursue the leadership regardless of the costs. Investing in R&D includes risk since 
there are no guarantee the outcome would be prolific. According to prospect theory 
people avoid uncertain wins and prefer short-term benefits over long-term advantages, 
even when the short-term wins are smaller.  
 
 
2.5 Value destroying theories  
Majority of mergers fail and do not increase shareholder value (Christensen, Alton, Ris-
ing & Waldeck, 2011). Similar results have been observed in other studies as well. Mer-
gers fail for several reasons, such as flawed intentions, unfavourable macroeconomic 
conditions, poor communications and weak implementation. The common factor of 
value-destrroying theories is rooted in managerial level and the theories can be classified 
into two groups. The first group assumes that the management of acquirer is not fully 
rational. The second profess the rationality but alongside personal incentives (Weitzel & 
McCarthy, 2011). Value destroying theories include managerial hubris, discreditation, 
entrenchment and empire building.  
  
2.5.1 Hubris  
Managerial hubris is a phenomenon where the value of the target firms is miscalculated 
(Roll 1986). This miscalculation results from overconfidence or arrogance of firm 
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management. Hubris is common among overconfident managers who have tendency to 
go blind to their deficiencies (Kroll, Toombs & Wright, 2000). They overestimate their 
abilities to create shareholder value. Due to hubris the managers may take excessive 
risks when acquiring a company without proper evaluation. 
  
Overconfidence increases the likelihood to overpay from the target firm (Malmendier & 
Tate, 2008). There is empirical evidence about hubris in both US and Europe, where ap-
proximately one third of M&As is motivated by hubris. Rau & Vermaelen (1998) state 
that hubris is more common among so called glamour firms with low book-to-market 
ratios. Motives for M&A can also be speculative. Yet, evaluating speculative behaviour is 
challenging because managers barely want to admit to having pursued acquisitions op-
portunistically (Ali-Yrkkö, 2001).  
  
  
2.5.2 Discreditation  
Jensen (1986) moves the focus of motivation from personal traits to company’s balance 
sheet. He presents that unprofitable mergers are due to excess liquidity and free cash 
flow. According to Martynova & Renneboog (2008) executives have tendency to invest 
the money to M&As even when there are no well-performing target companies on the 
merger market. Counterintuitively, the more excess money the company has, the more 
short-sighted decisions the managers make. This can be a result from house money-ef-
fect and mental accounting, where managers take greater risk when reinvesting profits 
and other “extra” money. Instead of investing the money into something long-term the 
money is spent in strategic decisions that need little consideration. This is opposite to 
the firms with low liquidity (Weitzel & McCarthy, 2011). The management can also feel 
pressure from other stakeholders to execute mergers rather than keeping the money 
reserved for future investments. 
  
The similarity with previous theory arises not from manager’s personal incentives but 
from irrationality. However, this does not exclude the simultaneous opportunistic 
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behaviour of management. Managers consider and evaluate the M&As more when they 
are concerned financially themselves (Harford, 1999). 
 
2.5.3 Entrenchment  
The theory of managerial entrenchment suggests that the management enters invest-
ments that minimize the risk of being replaced (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). Entrenchment 
has confluence with corporate control theory, and it can act as a counterforce for that. 
Whereas corporate control theory suggests that incompetent managers are replaced, 
entrenchment is a phenomenon than makes the managers fight for their position. The 
managers aim to increase not the shareholder value but their own individual value to 
the company. They execute investments with high opportunity costs so that the replace-
ment of current manager would be expensive. Therefore, the investments do not tend 
to be long-term since long time intervals before profit making increase the risk and R&D 
expenditures cannot be capitalized easily.   
  
Risk-aversion further reduce investment rate on long-term projects. This has negative 
impact on shareholder value since the asset allocation is not optimum. Counterintui-
tively, the better position, the fewer risks are taken. Like other people, managers also 
avoid uncertain wins and want to ensure their position (Kahnemann, 2011). Besides job 
security managers may aim to gain fame, wealth and status as well. Managers pursue 
especially conglomerate mergers in order to make the earnings rate more stable by de-
creasing earnings volatility (Amihud & Lev, 1981). High volatility in earnings makes the 
stakeholders incredulous and impairs the position of manager. Chakraborty, Rzakhanov 
& Sheikh (2014) present that managers whose position is secured perform poorly on 
innovation which eventually lead to lower firm value. However, high-tech companies 
seem to be robust against managerial incentives and the impact of value decreasing phe-




2.5.4 Empire building  
Like entrenchment, empire building too arises from personal incentives and cause 
agency problems. Managers aim to grow the business as fast as possible with minimum 
profit requirements. This is problematic since growth alone does not indicate the long-
term success. Growth without profitability serves the management but not the share-
holders. As the desired rate of return is not fulfilled, the value for shareholder decreases 
(Weitzel & McCarthy, 2011).  
  
Growth through M&As is often motivated by managerial power and the goal is to max-
imize growth rather than profits (Rhoades, 1983). This do not favour any long-time com-
mitments, since long-term advantages resulting from R&D require risk-taking. From this 
perspective it seems that internal growth through R&D is more sustainable than inor-




2.6 Principal-agent dilemma 
The principal-agent dilemma is an example of moral hazard and it usually arises from 
managerial incentives in value-destroying theories. The typical situation is excessive risk-
taking in pursuing fast growth on the expense of shareholder value. The principal-agent 
problem may arise between the acquiring firm (principal) and the target (agent), too. 
The acquirer is seeking to maximize the benefits from the merger with minimum price. 
The target firm, in turn, seeks maximized premium with minimum effort. Managers with 
hubris overestimates their capacity to harvest synergies and value from the selling firm 
ending up paying unjustified premia (Hodgkingson & Partington, 2008). 
 
Asymmetric information between acquirer and target most likely has explanatory power 
over high failure rate in M&As. Information asymmetry can be related to hidden firm 
characteristics, actions, information or intentions. Several studies conclude that the 
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information asymmetry affects the uncertainty and wealth generated by both acquirer 
and target (e.g., Officer, Poulsen & Stegemoller, 2009; Chemmanur, Paeglis & Simonyan, 
2009).   
  
 
Figure 2. Principal-agent dilemma 
 
In order to pay justified premium the acquirer must evaluate and price the target cor-
rectly. Likewise, the increase in wealth for the shareholders of the target firm depend on 
the acquirer’s ability to extract value from target and create synergies (Luypaert & Van 
Caneghem, 2017). A “lemons problem” proposed by Akerlof (1970) refers to hidden 
characteristics and occur when the target firm possesses undisclosed information about 
its own value and accepts only offers that exceed its actual value. Luypaert & Van 
Caneghem (2017) suggest that to protect themselves from adverse selection the ac-
quirer can offer the payment in stocks, when the value for the target is also dependent 
on the market reaction between the M&A announcement and M&A completion. On the 
other hand, if the acquirer believes there will be incremental gains after the deal com-
pletion, the acquirer tries to keep any additional gains to themselves. In that case the 




3 Research & Development 
Companies invest money on research and development activities in order to obtain new 
information, to develop better technology and to contribute to innovation. This helps 
companies to solve problems, gain advantage in competitive markets and to gain in-
creased profits in the future. R&D is one of the companies’ key activities. The role and 
the importance of R&D depends on company’s activities, industry, and macroeconomic 
factors. R&D is the starting point when a company wants to launch a new project or 
service. It takes a lot of money and time and it creates the base to later success. Von 
Zedtwitz & Gassmann (2002) observe that research is centralized in only five areas in the 
world, whereas development takes place more globally. This thesis investigates next the 
essence of R&D and why companies should spend money on that. Then the factors that 
may have an impact on willingness to invest in R&D are analysed briefly. Those factors 
are touched on with PEST analysis. Willingness to invest in R&D depends on managerial 
views and missions but is affected by many other factors, too. 
  
Studies show that R&D expenditures are the most important variable in innovation (Dosi, 
1988; Freeman & Soete, 1997), although they do not directly measure the amount and 
quality of innovations. Shefer & Frenkel (2005) also state that if the company has had a 
successful innovation in the past, it is more likely to increase its’ R&D budget in the future. 
R&D is ultimately the source for the increase in the total revenue and productivity. The 
results of R&D are not immediate but rather cumulative. Within successful R&D 
companies gain advantages in the markets by sparing raw materials, reducing cost which 




3.1 R&D expenditures by country and industry 
The amount of R&D investments differs between industries and countries. For now, the 
biggest R&D expenditures are concentrated on a few industries. Top three industries 
24 
 
measured in R&D expenditures in 2018 are pharmacy & heathcare, computing & elec-
tronics and software & internet (Jaruzelski, Chwalik & Goehle, 2018). Technology has 
improved rapidly in recent decades and that development is expected to be continued 
in accelerated phase. Fast and anticipatory development is crucial because current tech-
nology becomes obsolete fast and it needs to be constantly developed. In technological 
frontier there is a lot of competition, start-ups and giant multinational corporations com-
peting together. The leap to the technology front line is relatively easy to take whereas 
moving the frontier ever beyond is tougher. Companies operating in pharmacy & 
healthcare are competing with patents to maintain profit margins and to cover R&D ex-
penditures.  The demand is also increasing due to shift in age distribution as people are 
aging in western countries. Healthcare has also the preventive aspect; it is most often 
easier to prevent diseases than cure them. 
 
Studies show that besides the industry R&D expenditures have connection to the size of 
the firm, location, type of ownership and organizational structure. R&D concentrates on 
urban areas. R&D expenditures and firms size has a positive correlation; large companies 
spend more on R&D than small ones (Fisher & Temin, 1973). High-tech companies are 
often export-oriented and as shown earlier, industries related to high technology use 
significant share of global R&D expenses (Shefer & Frenkel, 2005).  
 
The biggest investors on R&D in absolute are the US, China, Japan and Germany. Top ten 
companies investing the most in R&D in August 2019 are all originated from either US or 
China when measured by market capitalization (Ventura, 2019). Countries spending the 
most dross domestic expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP in 2016 are the US, 
China, Australia, France, Germany, Sweden and Finland. Interesting fact is that whereas 
the share of western countries in R&D spending has dropped, East Asia has increased its 
share since the financial crisis (UNESCO Institute for Statistic Estimates, 2019).  Especially 
China has increased its R&D spending in accelerating phase. Figure 3 below shows that 
the increase in gross domestic R&D expenditures has been growing steadily in US and 





Figure 3. Gross domestic R&D expenditures 1990-2017 
 
 
3.2 Buyers and sellers  
Bena & Li (2013) present that in general companies with lot of patents in their portfolios 
and low current R&D expenditures are acquirers, whereas companies who invest a lot in 
research and development, have fewer intangible assets and slower growth rate are tar-
get firms. Acquirers also have higher innovation output. In other words, larger firms and 
fast-growing firms with better operating performance are more likely to be acquirers 
whereas smaller or lower-growing firms end more likely to be target firms. Start-ups 
make an exception being fast-growing and in-demand targets. For some deals, acquirers 
are motivated by the target firm’s R&D that is not fully commercialized and sellers are 
motivated by the premium they receive in the acquisition (Szücs, 2014). Technological 
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overlap benefits for both the acquirer and the target when the motivation for the merger 
or acquisition arise from synergy benefits. Therefore, firms that have high innovation 
rate are likely to engage mergers and acquisitions. Technological acquisitions that are 
driven by synergy are reported to improve their later innovation outcomes. 
 
Companies to be absorbed through friendly takeovers are usually relatively young and  
fast growing. Haller & Johnson (2019) report that innovation in technology companies is 
in transition from internal R&D to start-ups which are more often financed by venture 
capital. Small companies that want to sell out may decide to invest more in R&D (Phillips 
& Zhdanov, 2012). Those firms tend to have high Tobin’s q ratio meaning the market 
value of company that is divided by company’s assets’ replacement costs. When the ac-
quisition is hostile, the target firm is usually older but relatively smaller firm, whose 
growth has slowed down significantly. (Morck et al, 1988.)   
 
 
3.3 Exogenous factors affecting on R&D  
The macroeconomic environment sets the framework for companies’ operations and 
they must be able to cope with the changes that occur around them. Over 30 years many 
scholars have attempted to find and explain the critical factors that define the success 
of projects generated from R&D. These factors can be found at the firm-level as well as 
from macroeconomic environment. Because alongside M&A there are a set of other fac-
tors affecting R&D, in the next subsections there are presented some environmental fac-
tors that contribute to decisions about R&D investments. This review is rooted in PEST 
analysis.   
   
  
3.3.1 Political and Legislative factors  
Several economic studies show that regulation decreases productivity growth (Gray & 
Shadbeglan, 1993). According to Aggarwal (2000), interference by government had 
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dampening effects on technology imports and therefore on R&D as well in certain re-
gimes of India. In the studies conducted in the US the findings suggest that when gov-
ernment discharges regulation on energy sector, the R&D expenditures decreases 
(Dooley, 1998). This kind of behaviour can result negative externalities to the environ-
ment. Therefore, sometimes legislation act as indirect incentive for R&D, for example by 
imposing pollution or emission taxes. In numerous studies published it is presented that 
under incentive-based environmental policies incentives towards R&D are stronger than 
under control and command (Jaffe & palmer, 1997). R&D expenditures are increased 
when the societies face mutual challenges. Fernándes, López & Blanco (2018) find that 
the net effect of innovation has positive impact on CO2 –emissions since there is an in-
verse relationship between innovation and CO2-emissions. The significance in the role 
of the politics is uncharted, but it is likely that politics can either help to speed up the 
innovation or suppress that by trying to influence on public opinion.  
  
3.3.2 Economic factors  
Cyclical patterns can be observed when examining the amount of firm-financed R&D ex-
penditures. Overall innovation may decrease over time if the amount reduced in R&D 
during downturns is bigger than the excess amount invested in booms. (Rafferty, 2003; 
Fatas, 2000). It can be easy to cut the budget of R&D since R&D exertions are not crucial 
in everyday operations (Barret, Musso & Pahdi 2009). It could be reasoned that the 
trade-off between M&A and R&D is emphasized when the economy is slumping, since it 
is easier to search growth from acquisitions than take more risks by increasing expendi-
tures for the accounting period.  
 
Figure 3 below shows the parallel movements in GDP and R&D expenditures growth. 






 Figure 4. Global GDP and R&D growth 
 
During dotcom -crash in 2002 and financial crisis in 2009 the growth of R&D spending 
reached zero or even negative values. 
 
3.3.3 Sociocultural factors  
At least for now R&D cannot be outsourced to machinery, and R&D is conducted by hu-
mans. Therefore, sociocultural factors and human capital play a critical role in research 
and development. Wang & Huang (2007) present that the better general English skill 
level the country has, the more it will invest on research and development activities. This 
is not unequivocal since speaking a certain language is not a condition for R&D, but high 
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national skill level in English implicates that the country has prerequisites for interna-
tional cooperation that promote innovation spread. Lee, Wong & Chong (2005) add that 
education is major factor in R&D since complex tasks require strong educational base. 
This human capital can, in turn, be shared and accumulated via mergers and acquisition 
and increase the post-merger value (Lee, Mauer & Zu, 2018).   
  
 
3.4 R&D effectiveness  
Increasing the effectiveness of R&D is the most important objective in R&D management. 
Effectiveness must be proved for several reasons; to justify the R&D expenditures, to 
estimate the growth via R&D exertion and to further improve efficiency (Schwartz, Miller 
& Plummer, 2011). Measuring R&D effectiveness is tricky since R&D projects are usually 
complex and time-consuming. Several aspects, such as competition and customer sup-
port must be considered as well. Expenditures alone is not relevant measurement. For 
example, consulting company Booz & Company states that R&D expenditures do not 
correlate with company’s market value, and the crucial factors are innovation-oriented 
culture and strategic alignment (Knott, 2012). However, those are hard to measure since 
they cannot be converted into numerical data.  
  
According to Werner & Souder (1997) methods developed to measure R&D effectiveness 
lack systematic classification. Techniques are often divided between micro- and mac-
rolevel. The former measures the impact in firm level and the latter view the effects in 
the whole society. The metrics used also vary case by case and can be quantitative, qual-
itative or combination of these two. The problem is to find matching metrics for every 
layer of R&D process. McGrath & Romeri (1994) present the R&D effectiveness index, 
which measure product development performance by comparing product’s profits to its 
expenses during product development stage. After application they find strong positive 
relation of the index and other factors that measure R&D performance. Also, strategic 
tools, like Balanced Scorecard are used to evaluate R&D performance (Bremser & Barsky, 
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2004). Its advantage is that it measures both financial and non-financial aspects. It also 
brings managerial commitment and leadership skills into evaluation.  
  
Knott (2012) presents research quotient (RQ), a new metric for measuring R&D produc-
tivity. It helps to evaluate the R&D performance compared to competitors and to per-
ceive the relation between R&D strategy and profitability. It uses the same formula than 
in measuring capital and labour productivity but expands this equation by adding third 
input. To successfully calculate RQ one needs enough data of components. 100 denoting 
the average, most companies measured have RQ between 86 and 115. (Knott, 2012).  
  
RQ is stated to be universal, reliable and uniform. It gathers the data straight from nu-
merical financial information, so there are no restrictions concerning firm size or industry. 
Preliminary findings suggest that RQ rises within the breadth of company’s activities and 
varies for different innovation types. RQ is also negatively correlated with outsourced 
R&D which favours that R&D made in-house outperforms cooperative R&D. (Knott, 
2012.) Even though RQ is relatively new, several studies have adopted the concept (see 





4 Data and Methodology 
This chapter presents the data and methodology for the empirical research. Then, the 
methods and model specifications used to test the hypotheses are introduced. The use 




The data is retrieved and combined from Worldscope and Datastream platforms from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon database. The sample consists of M&As with technology target 
and US technology acquirer during the time period of 2010-2018. The sample includes a 
wide range of technology-intensive industries, categorized by the following 2-digit SIC 
codes: 28, 35, 36, 37, 38, 48, 73 & 871. This categorization is originally adapted from 
OECD and first used by Hall & Vopel (1996). Firms whose primary business sector is solely 
in software are excluded from the sample, since for those companies, intellectual prop-
erty is secured usually with copyrights, not with patents.  
 
The dataset contains completed control M&As where the ownership of the target firm is 
less than 50% before the transaction and 50% or more after it. In most cases the bidding 
firm acquires 100% of the voting shares of the target firm. Data selection is limited to 
public acquirers since the information from financial statements is more readily obtained 
for public companies, and they are also more closely followed by analysts and investors. 
The target companies come from US and other developed countries. Almost every ac-
quisition in the sample was reported to be a friendly one, suggesting that the motives 
arise from synergies. 
 
The study consists of a sample with 401 acquirers yielding 3,609 firm-year observations. 
An important criterion for sample selection was the financial statement availability. Table 
 
1 See appendix A. 
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1 describes the distribution of acquirers and acquisitions over the examination period. 
The total number of M&As is 2,810, but in the final sample only one acquisition per firm 
per year is included. That leaves 1,474 M&As. If the acquirer makes several acquisitions 
within a year, those acquisitions are recorded in the DEALSit variable. This criterion has 
been previously applied by Kallunki, Pyykkö & Laamanen (2009) and Danzon, Epstein and 
Nicholson (2004). Targets and acquirers of all sizes are included in the sample, but due 
the lack of disclosed information the size of the target company in relation to the size of 
the acquirer cannot be controlled for.  
 
Table 1 shows that the M&As are slightly decreasing towards the end of the examination 
period, except for the year of 2010 when the number of M&As was less than half of the 
acquisitions in next year. This is due the global financial crisis which cut the global M&A 
volumes. In the sample only acquirers with information at least one year before and one 
year after the M&As are included. Further, companies that were acquired during the 
examination period as well as dead companies were excluded from the sample. Table 2 
presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions. 
 
Table 2 reports the mean, median, standard deviation and minimum and maximum val-
ues for the variables, which are as follows: RDit is the acquirer i’s R&D expenditures in 
year t; BVit is the acquirer i’s book value of equity in year t; Pit is the market value of 
acquirer i’s equity in year t; Eit is the net income of acquirer i before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations in year t; TAit it the acquirer i’s total assets in year t (in mil-
lion dollars); DEALSit is the number of other acquisitions the acquirer i has made in the 
year of the M&Ait and CHSit is the acquirer i’s closely held shares that are held by insiders 
in proportion to common shares outstanding. First three variables are trimmed at 2 % 
since the dataset displayed values so extreme that they could not be considered plausi-
ble.  Further, some of the firms displayed temporarily negative book value of equity dur-
ing the examination period resulting negative minimum values. Yet, most of the compa-





























Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Year Number of Acquirers per year Number of M&As 
   
2010 105 186 
2011 179 376 
2012 176 359 
2013 157 300 
2014 166 324 
2015 172 335 
2016 177 345 
2017 176 298 
2018 166 287 
Total 1,474 2,810 
Variable Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
RDit/BVit 0.142 0.085 0.209 -1.104 1.586 
Pit/BVit 3.836 2.879 4.498 -28.250 34.286 
Eit/BVit 0.077 0.110 0.382 -2.737 2.728 
TAit 11,976 1,593 43,261 0.002 751,216 
DEALSit 0.370 0.000 1.110 0.000 15.000 
CHSit 7.929 2.370 12.227 0.016 99.411 
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From table 2 it can be observed that among the acquirers there are some “tech giants” 
with massive total assets. Those firms usually have multiple acquisitions per year. Simi-
larly, at least half of the firm have only one acquisitions per year, as can be seen from 
the descriptive statistics for the variable DEALSit.  
 
 
4.2 Research design 
The methodology and model specification closely follow the study from Kallunki, Pyykkö 
& Laamanen (2009). They compare the market valuation of acquirer’s R&D spending and 
the linkage between R&D spending and future profitability in the year of the M&As be-
tween technology and non-technology acquirers. Similar model specifications are used 
in this study, although with reduced number of control variables. To test, whether the 
M&As with technology target increases the valuation of acquirer’s current R&D spending, 
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Where additional variables M&Ait and YEARy are indicator variables. M&Ait is given value 
of 1 if an acquirer i has bought a company in year t and 0 otherwise. For YEARy value 1 is 
given in year y and 0 in other years. In all model specifications cross-sections and periods 
are fixed. Results from this equation are reported in table 3. The robustness of the results 
from this equation is tested with Generalized Method of Moments technique. The re-




The Xit represent the three control variables used in the regression. Total assets of the 
acquirer are included since the size of the buyer may have a significant role in M&A per-
formance and future shareholder value creation. There are several reasons for this. First, 
large public companies are more closely followed by analysts and media (Booth et al, 
2006). Moreover, large companies usually have larger resources to extract value and fully 
utilize R&D obtained in acquisition (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). However, the size of the ac-
quirer can also have negative impact on post-merger performance. It is reported that 
there is an inverse relationship between the size of the acquirer and the abnormal re-
turns after M&A. This finding has been explained by unjustified premium paid to target 
firms. Managerial hubris predisposes to pay extra price since managers exaggerate their 
abilities to create synergies (Moeller et al, 2004).  
 
Second, one variable to control for acquirer’s ownership structure is obtained. This vari-
able, closely held shares scaled by buyer’s common shares outstanding, represents the 
proportion of shares held by insiders. There is mixed evidence about the effect of own-
ership and managements on firm performance and corporate investment. If the man-
agement is little engaged personally and do not hold equity in company, an agent prob-
lem may arise since decisions related to M&As may be affected by managerial hubris or 
other personal incentives. From descriptive statistics the share of closely related shares 
is generally low in this sample. This can also be a good sign, since the management be-
comes risk-aversive if their own wealth is tied to one company. This leads managers to 
abandon risky but viable projects with positive net present value (Smith & Stulz, 1985). 
In the long run excessive risk aversion may lead to decision-making that is not optimal 
for the shareholders.  
 
The last control variable used in this thesis is DEALSit. It measures the number of other 
M&As the acquirer i has conducted in year t. The M&A activity can bear positive or neg-
ative effects to the stock market reaction (Fuller et al, 2002). On the other hand, if the 
acquirer has made successful acquisitions before the year of current M&A, it indicates 
that the acquirer has the ability to utilize outsourced R&D and harness synergies from 
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the M&As. As chapter 2 presents, large firms are usually buyers and in a state where they 
are familiar with challenges in executing M&As (Hitt et al, 2001). In other words, they 
are agile and have attainments for consequent acquisition. In the sample used in this 
study it can be seen that at least half of the companies did buy only one target per year, 
but there are also firms that have acquired over 10 companies within one year. Higgins 
& Rodriquez (2006) report that companies have negative abnormal returns if they have 
prior engagement in M&A within three years before current M&A. It is suggested that 
investors tend to interpret multiple technology acquisitions as a sign of inferior internal 
R&D activities.  
 
Kallunki, Pyykkö & Laamanen (2009) used several other control variables, such as ac-
quirer executives’ in-the-money options, cash-bonus compensation, size and dummy 
variable to distinguish the mergers from acquisitions. Due to lack of available data these 
are not used in this study. However, Kallunki et al. find that only closely held shares and 
options of the executives are statistically significant in explaining stock market valuation 
of the acquiring firm’s R&D spending in technology-oriented M&As. 
 
For the second hypothesis the average three-years and five-years-ahead net income is 
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∗  𝑀&𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗  ℰ𝑖𝑡   (3) 
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Where Eit is the acquirer i’s net income before extraordinary items in year t; BVit is the 
acquirer i’s book value of equity in year t, RDit is acquirer i’s R&D spending in year t, 
M&Ait is a dummy variable getting value of 1 if an acquirer i makes M&A in year t and 
otherwise equal to zero. Further, R&D spending in the following years are included in the 
model since they are likely to also have an impact on firm’s profitability. Current earnings 
are included since they have been detected to predict earnings in the future, too (Kal-
lunki, Pyykkö & Laamanen, 2009). All the variables are interacted with the M&Ait variable 
to see whether it is the M&A that strengthens the linkage between future profitability 
and R&D spending in year t. Results from the equations (2) and (3) are presented in the 




In this chapter the results from the regression are presented. First sub-chapter discloses 
the first hypothesis and second sub-chapter the second hypothesis. After reporting the 
results there are also additional test of acquirer’s post-merger R&D spending and robust-
ness test made with GMM estimation technique to strengthen the conclusions from test-
ing hypothesis 1. P-values are reported in the brackets and asterisks *, ** and *** indi-
cate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Not all the results are unambiguous 
and there is certainly room for further exploration and discussion.  
 
 
5.1 M&A and R&D valuation 
Results from testing the hypothesis 1 with first regression are represented below in table 
3. The results show that the estimated coefficient for the interaction variable 
RDit/BVit*M&Ait is positive at 5 % level in column 3 and at 1 % level in column 4, where 
all the control variables are included. The result indicates that when technology firm 
buys another technology firm, the stock market valuation of the acquirer’s R&D spending  
is enhanced. Stock markets anticipate that the M&A between two technology firm im-
proves the R&D operations of an acquiring firm and that the buyer is able to utilize the 
acquired R&D in its business. Positive stock market response also indicates that the mar-
ket expects the acquirer to be able to convert the combined R&D exertions into future 
profitability. The estimated parameters RDit/BVit and RDit/BVit*M&Ait can be compared 
to examine the magnitude of the stock market response (Kallunki, Pyykkö & Laamanen, 
2009). In column 4 the RDit/BVit gets value of 12.653 and the interaction variable 
RDit/BVit*M&Ait gets value of 2.483. It can be calculated that there is a 20% increase 
(2.483/12.653) in the stock market response towards acquirer’s R&D spending in the 
year of the M&A. Hence, the first hypothesis, 
 
H1: The current market valuation of the technology acquirer’s R&D spending increases 




is confirmed.  
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 







































TAit    0.000 
(0.612) 
RDit/BVit * M&Ait * TAit    0.000 
(0.084)*** 
DEALSit    -0.095 
(0.209) 
RDit/BVit*M&Ait* DEALSit    -0.011 
(0.980) 
CHSit    -0.018 
(0.005)* 
RDit/BVit * M&Ait *CHSit    -0.013 
(0.632) 
Yearly controls Included Included Included Included 
Industry controls Included Included Included Included 












Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 




However, the response towards acquirer’s earnings in year of M&A is perhaps even more 
interesting. The estimated parameter for variable Eit/BVit and for the interaction variable 
Eit/BVit*MAit are also both positive and significant. There is an increase of 112% 
(2.559/2.280) in stock price response to the acquirer’s earnings in the year of M&A. The 
economic impact of stock market response towards earnings is much stronger than the 
response towards R&D spending. This suggests that the current earnings create expec-
tations for generating future earnings, too, and that these expectations are strongly 
strengthened after the merger. Investors place value on both earnings and R&D during 
the year of M&A, but they are unquestionably more interested in earnings. These find-
ings suggest that investors expect the future performance being generated more 
through increased market power than via synergies in R&D exertions.  
 
Only one control variable and one interaction term are significant. Interaction term with 
total assets is significant on 10% level but has no economic impact. Second is closely held 




5.2 M&A, R&D spending and profitability 
The results from testing hypothesis 2 are found in table 4. When looking for average 3-
years-ahead earnings the variable RDit/BVit is significant at 1% meaning that the current 
R&D exertions explain the future profitability. The consequent R&D spending most likely 
explains future earnings, too. Almost every estimated parameter for consequent R&D 
spending are positive and most of them are statistically significant.  
 
More surprisingly, the current earnings do not explain the next three- or five-years prof-
itability, even when market expects them to do. The positive stock market response to-
wards acquirer’s earnings in the year of the M&A may suggest that the investors expect 
that the greater the earnings, the better financial prerequisites the acquirer has to cope 



























RDit+3/BVit+3  0.177 
(0.004)* 






















RDit+3/BVit+3 * M&Ait  0.031 
(0.767) 
RDit+4/BVit+4 * M&Ait  -0.041 
(0.446) 







   
 
Asterisks *,** and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 




The interaction variable RDit/BVit*M&Ait is positive but not significant in 5-years-ahead 
model, meaning that the second hypothesis, 
 
H2: Acquiring a technology target strengthens the linkage between technology ac-
quirer’s R&D spending and its future profitability, 
 
is not confirmed. When technology firm acquires a technology target, the R&D spending 
of the acquirer is not translated into future profitability more strongly than in other years. 
The stock market anticipation towards increased future profitability through R&D spend-
ing in the year of M&A are reflected in enhanced valuation of the R&D spending in the 
same year, but the expectations are not always fulfilled. It remains inconclusive whether 
the acquiring firm can extract enough value from target firm’s R&D assets to generate 
additional future earnings.  
 
To summarize the results from testing the two hypotheses, it can be concluded that there 
is a positive relationship between R&D spending, stock market valuation and future prof-
itability. M&A has a positive impact on valuation of acquirer’s R&D spending and even 
greater impact on valuation of acquirer’s earnings in the year of M&A. However, these 
responses are overshooting since the R&D spending in the year of M&A do not translate 
into future profitability more strongly than in other years. Likewise, the net income in 
the year of M&A is not reflected in the future profitability. This disparity between expec-
tations and actual outcome may be an indicator of post-merger integration problems. 
 
 
5.3 Post-merger R&D expenditures 
Majority of prior studies suggests that the R&D spending of the acquirer decrease after 
the M&As. This is tested as additional analysis and the results are reported in table 5. 







=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀&𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  ∑𝑦=2010
2018  𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑦 + ℰ𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
Where RDit is the acquirer i’s R&D expenditures in year t, BVit is the acquirer i’s book 
value of equity in year t, M&Ait is an indicator variable with value of 1 if acquirer i ac-
quires a company in year t and otherwise zero, and YEARy is another indicator variable 
getting value of 1 in year y and zero otherwise. The results from this regression are re-
ported in table 5. 
 
 
Dependent variable Intercept M&A N R2 
(Adj. R2) 








Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 5. Acquirer’s post-merger R&D spending 
 
As the table shows, there is a reduction in acquirer i’s R&D expenditures in the year of 
M&As and it is significant at 1 % level. This finding is in line with prior literature that 
suggest that the R&D expenditures are decreased in the acquiring firm when it buys a 
technology target (Hitt et al, 1991).  
 
 
5.4 Robustness test 
Table 6 reports the results from using alternative model, generalized method of mo-
ments. This model is useful since it is able to assess potential heteroskedasticity and au-
tocorrelation in the data. It is also applicable in the situations where the full shape of the 
sample distribution is unknown and where maximum likelihood estimation cannot be 







Table 6. Results from using Generalized Method of Moments 
 










Eit/BVit * M&Ait 2.559 
(0.000)* 












RDit/BVit * M&Ait * TAit 0.000 
(0.056)* 









Mergers and acquisitions and their impact on research and development has been a 
popular topic but not much investigated in terms of long-term effects on competitive 
advantages and shareholder value. In this chapter the aim is to present previous evi-
dence about how do mergers and acquisitions affect on R&D activities considering both 
the input and the output. Moreover, the aim is also to find out how does the possible 
trade-off affect long-term growth. The key is to optimize the allocation and maximize the 
return of investment (ROI) to increase shareholder value. 
  
As discussed in previous chapters, the incentives and outcomes of mergers and acquisi-
tions vary resulting changes in shareholder value and innovation rate. The time horizon 
is also an important aspect since in short term R&D cause expenses that lower the price 
to earnings ratio and net profits for the accounting period. The outcome can be seen 
only after a long period of time and the success is not guaranteed. This chapter presents 
evidence about the relationship between M&As and R&D and their impact on company’s 
prosperity. The findings are based on research and literature. The results of this study 
are also discussed and reflected in theoretical framework. 
  
  
6.1 Post-merger R&D spending 
The preliminary findings suggest that M&A decrease R&D intensity – R&D expenditures 
divided by turnover – more often than increase it. Empirical studies conducted in the US 
show that M&A have negative effect on R&D inputs. However, the volatility is high and 
robust interpretations cannot be made based on these findings alone (Cassiman et al., 
2005). Partial explanation is scarcity of resources and trade-off between M&A and R&D; 
the limited amount of money must be spent between them. This allocation is widely 
directed by the incentives of the executives. As presented in chapter two, managers pur-
suing personal interests, like entrenchment or empire building, tend to make strategic 
decisions that do not threat their current position. The explanators for reduced R&D 
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spending can also be found from value-increasing theory. In the light of the market 
power theory the merged companies reduce the competition and gain more pricing 
power in the market as united. M&A can end the “R&D race” between the competitors 
and decrease post-merger R&D spending. However, as drivers for mergers are usually a 
mixture from the theories presented, ending the R&D race combined with managerial 
incentives may blindsight the executives to settle to the current market position and not 
to invest in the future competitiveness.   
  
The outcomes of M&A likely have an impact on R&D spending, too. Studies show that 
usually shareholders in the target firms get premium and have positive cumulative ab-
normal returns after and prior to the announcement date. This is despite the variables 
such as time period, industry, merger type and measurement of cumulative abnormal 
returns (Campa & Hernando, 2004). This can be due to managerial hubris where the 
acquirer pays unfounded premium for the target firm. Shareholder value change in the 
acquiring firm is more ambiguous, but generally the gains are significantly smaller than 
gains for the target firm’s shareholders, or they turn out to be negative. Bruner (2002) 
presents that returns also tend to slightly decrease over time, too. Poor outcomes may 
hamper the R&D process by lowering the incentives for managers to take new risks. In 
previous literature there are mixed results about combined outcomes for target and 
buyer firms. Aktas, de Bodt & Declerck (2001) support findings presented in previous 
chapters and have found that around 50 % of mergers have destroyed value in the sec-
ond half of 19th century.   
  
Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland (1990) present that between firm’s acquisition and relative 
R&D intensity there is a negative relationship. Cassiman et al. (2005) amplifies that 
merged companies decrease their R&D level significantly when the merged companies 
have substitutive technologies. These findings suggest that post-merger R&D intensity 
decreases as new acquisitions are made, especially when the merging firms do not have 
any strategic fit. Bertrand (2009) presents opposite findings; in France foreign acquisi-
tions increased the R&D budget as mergers were motivated by overseas R&D 
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development and technology sourcing. This makes foreign acquirers willing to finance 
R&D of target firms. Similarly, Kallunki, Pyykkö & Laamanen (2009) that non-technology 
acquirers increase their R&D spending after acquiring a technology target. 
  
It is also important to investigate whether the R&D efficiency – number of patents di-
vided by turnover – changes after M&As. The reduction in R&D expenditures is not al-
ways bad for the business. R&D spending may decrease because of elimination of over-
lapping R&D activities (Cassiman et al, 2005). The post-merger effectiveness of R&D 
quality is harder to measure since there are no commonly used exact meters that would 
cover all the layers of R&D process. The literature exposes mixed results about how mer-
gers and acquisitions affect R&D quality. When the results from testing models 1 and 4 
are combined, it is found that the investors expect the acquirer to intensify its R&D ac-
tivities through technology M&A. 
  
Hitt et al. (1990) present several studies with findings that growth through acquisition 
may hamper the innovation and decrease the R&D outputs. This is when the acquirers 
make a trade-off between long-term innovation and rapid growth. Baysinger and Ho-
skisson (1989) replenish that the negative effect on patents is especially due to firm di-
versification. In diversifying acquisition, the technology of target firm can be ulterior or 
obscure to the acquirer and therefore left to be unutilized. Due to high premium the 
target firms receive in the deal the pressure to innovate slackens causing the target firm 
to reduce their exertions in R&D. (Hitt et al., 1990.) As the company grows it can also 
become more inflexible in its practises and procedures causing the creative atmosphere 
to flatten.  
  
Those who manage to increase the post-merger value tend to have a “strategic fit” (Hop-
kins, 1987). It could be reasoned that negative outcomes do not encourage to invest in 
R&D, especially when the original motive for the merger is short-sighted and arises from 
managers’ personal incentives. In literature dealing with corporate control it is suggested 
that internal efficiencies, capital market imperfections and agency problems can be 
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straightened through M&A (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Mergers also cause international 
spread of development. Overlapping and redundant R&D units are cancelled, and firms 
get access to new technology and markets (Von Zedtwitz & Gassmann, 2002). Cassiman 
et al. (2005) observe that merging companies with similar technologies perform stronger 
in post-merger R&D. They become more active and increase their R&D efficiency as well. 
The acquirer can help the target firm to commercialize their innovation more easily. It 
seems that mergers can have positive effect on R&D when they are motivated by syner-
gies and technology integration, the process is actively managed, the key personnel are 
retained and managers have strong base of knowledge – the ability to evaluate incen-
tives, partners and long-term consequences.  
  
  
6.2 Long-term effects  
As discussed earlier, R&D has ultimately the biggest influence in shareholder value and 
competitiveness, although it is not the only source for growth. Even small sustainable 
growth rate has significant influence on company’s profitability in a long run, as Boer 
(2004), demonstrates. As R&D expenditures tend to decrease the shareholder value due 
to lowered price-to-earnings ratio, it must be evaluated, to what extend are the current 
value acceptable to be sacrificed in order to increase shareholder wealth in the future.  
  
The shareholder value can fluctuate within the R&D stages and progression. First, the 
investors’ reactions to R&D announcements vary. High-tech companies, small businesses 
and frequent innovators get better responses than firms with less adequate technology 
or firms operating in industry where constant innovation is less common. The results 
from testing the first hypothesis strengthen this finding. Unexpected R&D projects are 
viewed risky. R&D investments do not have any value per se, but the investors rather 
evaluate the probabilities of success case by case. Stock price movements are derived 
from unforeseen information; expected positive cash flows increase the stock price and 
vice versa. Kelm, Narayanan & Pinches (1995) present two stages, innovation and com-
mercialization, for R&D projects. During innovation investors evaluate the company’s 
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capabilities to survive technology-related risks that are essential in R&D. They also con-
sider factors presented in PEST analysis and mirror the strategic fit to the environment. 
In the commercialization the focus shifts to the company’s positioning, since in that stage 
the technological challenges have been overcome and the aim is to thrive in the markets 
and acquire customers. It is relatively easy to catch up but harder to move the technology 
frontier forward. The aim is to retain the cashflows generated by the R&D exertions and 
not let the competitors benefit from the spillover. Big corporations can compete with 
prices so the innovation in smaller firms should be unique or targeted to small niches. 
Considering these facts, it could be interpreted that even though R&D announcements 
are received more readily from smaller firms, the innovation stage is also more crucial 
to them, because the innovation cannot be fully utilized and thus shareholder value is 
not maximized if the innovation is easy to reproduce. In technology M&A the acquirer’s 
and target firms combined R&D assets are viewed unique.  
 
R&D progress should be constantly evaluated, and unprofitable projects should be 
ceased immediately. Because of the sunken cost fallacy this is not easily done, even there 
is many valuable lessons to be learnt from failures, too. (Kelm et al., 1995.) To maximize 
the shareholder value in the long run the key is to allocate the resources between M&A 
and R&D activities effectively and maintain a balanced portfolio. Although the previous 
evidence suggests that post-merger R&D spending tend to decrease, the quality in R&D 
may increase resulting higher shareholder wealth. The motives, mode and type of entry 
and the execution of M&As largely define the post-merger outcome and set up the 
framework for future innovation and prosperity. Unfortunately, synergies are not easy to 




6.3 Post-merger integration 
Technology-oriented M&As target to broaden their scope to an increasing degree (Haller 
& Johnson, 2019). These so-called scope deals account the vast majority of technology 
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M&A in 2019. It is common that technology firm seeks access to new sectors, markets, 
and product lines. Big technology giants, like Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google and Mi-
crosoft have expanded in many areas of business and everyday life, and smaller firms 
are shifting towards this mode of operation in a smaller scale as well. When technology 
firms shift the focus away from horizontal mergers the importance of post-merger inte-
gration and careful due diligence are pronounced. Further, synergies are harder to find, 
even though the stock market still reacts positive when two tech firms announce about 
merger. In scope deals, which bear more resemblance to conglomerate or concentric 
mergers, revenue synergies are more uncertain since the different products, services and 
pricing models are harder to fit together (Haller & Johnson, 2019). Also managing the 
human capital and integrating the different corporate cultures is challenging. Retaining 
the talent and key personnel is also crucial. One notorious example from Finland is the 
merger with Nokia and Alcatel-Lucent in 2016. It seemed to be like a strategic fit, but the 
post-integration problems tainted the company’s reputation badly.  
 
As there is evidence that companies with strategic fit have the best prerequisites to suc-
ceed and increase long-term profitability, there is a need for further research in the in-
terface between those companies’ due diligence and corporate cultures in order to en-




The purpose of this thesis is to present the two strategic components that are involved 
in companies’ decisions and investigate the relationship between them. Mergers & ac-
quisitions serve as a way to rapid growth. M&As have increased their popularity during 
recent decades, especially in downturns when gaining organic growth is challenging. Re-
search and development, in turn, are only a small part among company operations, but 
their meaning in innovation and long-term competitiveness is crucial since ultimately 
premises to evolve and develop arise from the exertions in R&D activities. The aim is also 
to emphasize the possible trade-off between the M&A and R&D and investigate how this 
might affect on shareholder value in the long run.   
  
First, it is discovered that the incentives for M&As are either synergy-, agency- or hubris-
based or a combination of them. R&D can play a big role in synergy-based motives since 
studies show that mergers likely benefit more companies with complementary technol-
ogies. Target firms are usually investing a lot in R&D but have relatively slow growth rate 
whereas acquirers have a large patent portfolio and better operational performance, but 
in technology-driven industries it is common that the target firm too is a fast-growing 
company. M&As, in turn, are not considered to be usual motive for R&D investments. 
Rather, the R&D investing decisions are affected by several macrolevel and circumstan-
tial factors. Industry, firm size and PEST factors steer the amount of R&D expenditures.   
  
Second, it is suggested that the post-merger outcome may have an impact on future 
innovation. There are many studies that favour the view that mergers cause R&D input 
reduction, i.e. the amount spent on R&D. When investigating whether M&A also reduce 
the R&D outcome, i.e. number of patents, the results are more mixed. Nearly half the 
mergers fail causing shareholder value reduction. Reflecting the value-destroying theo-
ries the unpleasant outcome may be due to short-sighted decision making and manage-
rial motives that are not targeted to shareholder value maximization. Managerial hubris 
cause acquirer to pay high, unjustified premia for target firms ending up reducing share-
holder value in the acquiring firm. This combined to the entrenchment the willingness 
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to take new risks by investing in R&D reduces even more. Previous evidence suggests 
that diversifying, hostile acquisition generates little value or even destroy that. This dis-
creditation happen when the executives dump the excess liquidity to buy firms that are 
not the best strategic fit. The managers’ empire building strengthens this, because se-
lecting target firms with minimum profit requirements benefit the managers but not the 
shareholders.  
  
Mergers and acquisition can help both the target and acquirer companies to reduce 
overlapping functions, create synergies and eliminate capital market imperfections and 
agency problems. The acquirer can help the target firm in commercialization process and 
to fully utilize their resources.  At the same time the acquirer get access to new technol-
ogy. This supports the findings that synergy-thriven mergers where companies have 
complementary technologies create the best base for future innovation and shareholder 
value increase.   
 
This thesis tests how the stock market responses to acquirer’s R&D spending in the year 
of M&A in technology-driven industries and whether the acquirer is able to translate its 
current R&D spending into future profitability. A sample of technology mergers during 
2010-2018 with US public technology acquiror and technology target is constructed and 
tested with OLS regressions. It is found that in the year of M&A there is an increase in 
stock market response towards the valuation of acquirer’s current R&D spending indi-
cating that investors expect the spending can be converted into future profitability. How-
ever, there is even greater increase towards acquirer’s earnings indicating that investors 
place more value on them and may expect that the bigger the current profitability, the 
better prerequisites the acquirer has in coping with costs related to post-merger integra-
tion. The expectations do not always meet the reality since it is observed that the linkage 
between R&D spending in the year of the M&A and future profitability is not any 




These findings can illustrate the shift from so called scale deals to scope deals, that are 
more and more common in technology industries. Scope deals are more complex and 
motivated by access to new markets or product lines. Also the increased proportion of 
start-ups among the target companies increases the uncertainty in M&A outcomes. The 
changing nature of technology-oriented M&As emphasize the importance of due 
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Appendix A. SIC Codes: Standard Industrial Classification 
 
28 Manufacturing: Chemicals and allied products 
 
35 Manufacturing: Industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment 
 
36 Manufacturing: Electronic and other electrical equipment and components (excl. 
computer equipment) 
 
37  Manufacturing: Transportation equipment 
 
38 Manufacturing: Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling instruments; Photo-
graphic, medical and optical goods; Watches and clocks 
 
48 Transportation & public utilities: Communications 
 
73 Services: Business services 
 
87 Services: Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, and related services 
 
